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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 12-2793 
________________ 
 
JOE L. ANDREWS; ELGIN I. MCCARGO, Executor of the Estate of  
Annie McCargo-Andrews a/k/a Annie Murl McCargo-Andrews, 
 
Appellants 
 
v. 
 
MONROE COUNTY TRANSIT AUTHORITY; CHARLES JORDAN 
 
 
________________ 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil Action No. 3-11-cv-01859) 
District Judge: Honorable A. Richard Caputo 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 15, 2013 
 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN, and COWEN, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: April 25, 2013) 
 
________________ 
 
OPINION 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
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 Appellants Joe L. Andrews and Elgin I. McCargo appeal the District Court‟s 
dismissal of their Revised Amended Complaint against the Monroe County Transit 
Authority and Charles Jordan.  We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further 
proceedings.  
I. 
 On October 8, 2009, Andrews, who suffers from Alzheimer‟s disease, was 
shopping with his wife Annie McCargo-Andrews.
1
  While McCargo-Andrews was 
purchasing items, Andrews left the store and attempted to board a Monroe County Transit 
Authority (“MCTA”) bus.  Bus driver Charles Jordan stopped Andrews and asked where 
he was going and for payment.  Confused and disoriented, Andrews began to unzip his 
pants and remove his penis.  In response, Jordan began yelling at Andrews and then 
shoved and threw him from the bus to the concrete sidewalk.  Jordan at first closed the 
bus door, but then reopened it and left the bus to yell at and then strike Andrews, now 
lying prone on the sidewalk.  Jordan drove away, leaving Andrews on the sidewalk.   
 As a result of the incident, Andrews suffered a hip fracture requiring 
hospitalization and hip replacement surgery.  In addition, Andrews‟ mental condition 
deteriorated rapidly.  He became unable to follow instructions, intensely agitated, and, as 
a result, required physical restraints, extended hospitalization, and institutionalization.    
 Appellants filed suit against Jordan and the MCTA claiming a substantive due 
process violation through a state-created danger under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state-law 
claims for battery and vicarious liability.  Appellees filed a motion to dismiss under 
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 McCargo-Andrews is represented in this case by the executor of her estate.  
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Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to allege adequately the elements of 
state-created danger.  The District Court granted that motion but permitted Appellants to 
re-file their complaint.  Appellants filed a Revised Amended Complaint on February 8, 
2012, and Appellees again filed a motion to dismiss.  The Court dismissed Appellants‟ 
claim with prejudice and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over their state-
law claims.  Appellants filed this timely appeal.
2
  
II. 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court‟s dismissal under Federal Rule of 
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).  Byers v. Intuit, Inc., 600 F.3d 286, 291 (3d Cir. 2010).  In order 
to survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a plaintiff must state a “„plausible 
claim for relief.‟”  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 211 (3d Cir. 2009) 
(quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009)).  Rule 8(a)(2) requires only that a 
pleading contain “„a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is 
entitled to relief,‟ in order to „give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and 
the grounds upon which it rests.”  Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) 
(quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).  The Federal Rules do not require a 
plaintiff to set out a legal theory at the pleadings stage, and courts have upheld a 
complaint against a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss even though the plaintiff appeared to 
rely on an inappropriate theory.  5 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal 
Practice and Procedure § 1219 (3d ed. 2004); Bartholet v. Reishauer A.G., 953 F.2d 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we exercise appellate 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
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1073, 1078 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[T]he complaint need not identify a legal theory, and 
specifying an incorrect theory is not fatal.”).   
III. 
 For the reasons given by the District Court, we agree that Appellants have not pled 
a plausible claim for relief under a theory of state-created danger.  That theory is an 
exception to the general rule that the state is not required to protect citizens from harm.  It 
applies when state actors acted affirmatively either to expose a plaintiff to danger or to 
render him more vulnerable to harm.  Bright v. Westmoreland Cnty., 443 F.3d 276, 281 
(3d Cir. 2006).  The MCTA‟s failure to prevent Jordan from harming Andrews is an 
omission, not an affirmative act that placed him in danger.  
 Although the state-created danger theory is not applicable, we believe Appellants 
have stated a plausible claim for relief against Jordan under a theory of excessive force or 
a violation of substantive due process.  Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to demonstrate 
that a person deprived him of a federal right and did so under the color of state law.  
Groman v. Twp. of Manalapan, 47 F.3d 628, 633 (3d Cir. 1995).  Appellants have alleged 
that Jordan acted under MCTA authority to operate the bus.  As the District Court 
concluded, Appellants have pled facts that could plausibly demonstrate behavior that 
“shock[ed] the conscience.”  See Gottlieb v. Laurel Highlands Sch. Dist., 272 F.3d 168, 
172 (3d Cir. 2001) (“We . . . apply[] the Fourteenth Amendment‟s shocks the conscience 
standard to federal claims alleging the use of excessive force . . . .”); Cnty. of Sacramento 
v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 846 (“[F]or half a century now we have spoken of the cognizable 
level of executive abuse of power as that which shocks the conscience.”).   
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 Thus, Appellants should have the opportunity to proceed on this claim.  While we 
affirm the District Court‟s judgment dismissing the state-created danger claim, we 
reverse the dismissal of Appellant‟s Revised Amended Complaint, and remand to the 
District Court for further proceedings.    
  
 
